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The succession of statutes directed against "unfair competition" indicate
that either the non-statutory substantive law upon the subject or the processes
for enforcing it are regarded as inadequate. The Federal Trade Commission
Act declares "unfair methods of competition" in interstate commerce unlawful
and creates a Commission to enforce it.' The Tariff Act of 1930 following the
Tariff Act of 1922 declares "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts
in the importation of articles" unlawful, and empowers the Tariff Commis-
sion to hear and initiate complaints.2 The National Industrial Recovery Act 3
contained provisions, declared unconstitutional in the Schechter case,4 for the
adoption and enforcement of "Codes of Unfair Competition." The recent
Guffey bill provides for a code for the bituminous coal industry and specifies
certain acts to be proscribed by such code as "unfair methods of competition."'b
State legislatures are enacting statutes in this field, of broad or limited ap-
plication.6 Canada adopted a rather comprehensive statute upon the subject
in 1932; 7 and Japan, in 1934.8
Do these statutory enactments carry the substantive law of unfair com-
petition beyond the fundamental scope of the non-statutory law upon the
subject or only add to the remedial processes for enforcing it, or both? In
considering these questions, it is essential that we have in mind rather clearly
the fundamental basis and vitality of the non-statutory law upon the subject.
*Member of the Chicago Bar; Member of Committee on Federal and State Trade-
Mark Legislation and Committee on N. R. A. Codes, in the Patent, Trade-Mark and
Copyright Law Section of the American Bar Association; articles and notes in legal peri-
odicals.
1. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1927).
2. 46 STAT. 590 (1930), 19 U. S. C. A. § 1337 (1934).
3. 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 et seq. (1933).
4. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
5. 49 STAT.. , 15 U. S. C. A. § 807 (1935).
6. In addition to the State enactments which were designed to supplement the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act, we find a wave of legislative action adopting a statute, of
limited application, known as the Fair Trade Act. Calif. Laws 1931, c. 278, as amended by
Laws 1933, c. 260; Ill. Laws 1935, p. 1436; Iowa Laws 1935, S. B. 222; Md. Laws 1935,
c.212;N.J.Laws 1935, c. 58; N.Y. Laws 1935, c. 976;Ore. Laws 1935, c.245;Pa. Laws 1935,
Act No. 115; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 177; Wis. Laws 1935, c. 52. This act is in process of adop-
tion in many of the other states. California has also an Unfair Practice Act. Calif. Laws
1935, c. 477; and Wisconsin, a State Industrial Recovery Act, with provisions for codes
against "unfair competition." Wis. Laws 1935, cc. 182 and 451. Connecticut has a Retail
Drug Control Act. Conn. Laws 1935, c. 135a.
7. AN ACT RESPECTING UNFAIR COMPETITION IN TRADE & COMMERCE, 22-23 GEO.
V. c. 38 (1932).
8. THE UNFAIR-CoMPETITION LAw, see PATENTS, UTILITY MODELS, DESIGNS AND
TRADE-MARKS IN JAPAN, MANCHUKUO AND CHINA (1935) Kusaba & Co. 4.
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A search into the origin of the law of unfair competition confirms what
we find elsewhere in legal research, viz., that the law is a growth rather than a
science. A decision becomes a precedent, a precedent an analogy, and an anal-
ogy a fiction. Then in time the fiction is discarded for a more analytical state-
ment of the basis of the ultimate result and the evolutionary process sets in
anew. As said by the late Mr. Justice Holmes, more than half a century ago,
but in his characteristic expressiveness:
"The truth is that the law is always approaching, and never reaching
consistency ... It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases
to grow." 9
Thus, we find no juridical postulates in the Year Books from which the
present decisions upon unfair competition follow as the logical result of a
priori processes. Nor does the evolutionary process commence with a momen-
tous decision upon the subject. On the contrary, so far as published records
are available, the birth of this important branch of the law took place without
any pomp or ceremony and entirely unnoticed in an action at common law for
deceit brought and maintained in 1580 or 1595 for counterfeiting a trade-
mark." For a century and a half the record is then a blank. In that encyclo-
pedic digest of the law, Bacon's Abridgement, published in 1736, we find no
mention of any law of trade-marks-much less any law of unfair competition.
In 1742, we find the Chancery Courts appealed to for injunctive relief
against alleged trade-mark infringement. The injunction was denied. Lord
Hardwicke said:1
"... there is no foundation for this court to grant such an injunction.
Every particular trader has some particular mark or stamp; but I do
not know any instance of granting an injunction here, to restrain one
trader from using the same mark with another; and I think it would
be of mischievous consequences to do it.
"Mr. Attorney-General has mentioned a case, where an action at law
was brought by a cloth-worker against another of the same trade,
for using the same mark, and a judgment was given that the action
would lie. Poph. 151.
"But it was not the single act of making use of the mark that was
sufficient to maintain the action, but doing it with a fraudulent
design, to put off bad cloths by this means, or to draw away cus-
tomers from the other clothier; and there is no difference between a
9. HOLMES, THE COMMon" LAw (1881) 36.
10. 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENOLISn LAW (1926) 430.
11. Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (1742).
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tradesman's putting up the same sign, and making use of the same
mark, with another of the same trade. ....
"An objection has been made that the defendant in using this mark
prejudices the plaintiff by taking away his customers. But there is no
more weight in this than there would be in an objection to one inn-
keeper setting up the same sign with another ..
The reports give us no further light on the developments of this branch
of the law until in the period from 1833 to 1847.Y We there find a substantial
advance in the recognition and protection of trade rights. The law courts,
in actions upon the case for fraud, establish that even if trade-mark and trade
name proprietors cannot show actual damages, they are nevertheless entitled
to nominal damages in vindication of recognized legal rights.13 During the
same period, we find the chancery courts recognizing the right to injunctional
relief in these cases and carrying forward the evolutionary process to the
position that the interests of the trade-mark user are property, as such, and
are to be protected from invasion and injury irrespective of the fraudulent
or deceitful intent of the defendant. 14
From that period forward, the law upon this subject expands rapidly,
but, until comparatively recent times, such expansion has been more in the
detail of its application than in its substantive content. Its substantive con-
tent, as thus established in the early part of the nineteenth century continues
essentially without change into the beginning of the present century. Thus,
Street in that able analysis of the foundations of legal liability, published in
1906, says:'5
"Though the law concerning infringement of trade-marks and that
concerning unfair competition have a common conception at their
root, namely, the idea that one shall not misrepresent that his goods
or his business is the goods or the business of another, the law con-
cerning trade-marks occupies in a way a somewhat higher plane. The
infringement of a trade-mark, for instance, is conceived of as an
invasion of property. ... Unfair competition, on the other hand,
cannot be placed on the plane of invasion of property right. This
12. The apparent gaps in the history of the law on this subject probably reflect, more
fundamentally, the gaps in the development of the industrial, social and political trends
which give rise to the development of law. A more intelligent picture, as suggested by Mr.
Durant in his colossal undertaking, The Story of Civilization, partly published, would be a
portrayal of the industrial, social, political and juristic developments in their natural inter-
relation.
13. Blofeld v. Payne, 4 B. & Ald. 410 (1833); Morison et al. v. Salmon, 2 Man. & G.
385 (1841); Rodgers v. Nowill, 5 C. B. 109 (1847); Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. 214
(1837).
14. Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421 (1835); Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. & C. 338 (1838);
Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66 (1842).
15. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 421.
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tort is strictly one of fraud, and a fraudulent intent or its equivalent
is essential to liability."
But is this stated difference between the law of trade-marks and the gen-
eral law of unfair competition fundamental? Does not this statement reflect
only a stage in the development of a fundamental rather than a fundamental
itself? If the courts, by their inherent judicial power, may evolve the proposi-
tion that the user of a particular trade-mark, trade-name, or label, acquires an
exclusive property right therein, even as against an innocent adoption or use
by others, may they not evolve also the proposition that the originator of a par-
ticular trade dress, not a technical trade-mark, acquires an exclusive property
right therein, whether the later competitor acts fraudulently or innocently?
So, also, if the courts, by such inherent power, can evolve the proposition that
it is "unfair competition" and illegal for one competitor intentionally to copy
the distinctive trade dress of another competitor, may they not similarly
evolve the proposition that one competitor may not intentionally copy the
original designs of another competitor, whether in fabrics, millinery or other-
wise, during the useful trade life of such designs? True, the one is "palming
off" and the other is not; but if the courts may declare "palming off" to be an
unfair and illegal competitive practice, why may they not proceed to declare
illegal, actionable and enjoinable any other competitive practice which,
at least according to unquestioned and unquestionable standards, is "unfair"?
We are not now considering the advisability of so doing or the precise extent
to which the courts should go if they possess the power, or what the requisites
should be to determine whether a proffered standard is qualified for judicial
recognition. We are now considering only whether the fundamentals under-
lying the non-statutory substantive law of unfair competition are sufficiently
broad in scope to permit the courts to proceed to such results. We believe
that they are.'"
A substantial advance toward that ultimate position-if not beyond it-
is found in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Associated Press case."7 There, on complaint of the Associated Press against
another organization engaged in the gathering and transmitting of news, the
court enjoined, inter alia, the copying of news items from bulletin boards and
early editions of newspapers identified as part of the Associated Press system.
While the District Court was of the opinion that such use of the complainant's
news items constituted "unfair trade," it was recognized that the question
was one of first impression, and accordingly the court denied the injunction
against that practice to await the action of the appellate court.18 The Circuit
16. See, generally on the scope of the judicial power, Jerome Frank, Law and the
Modern Mind 32, et seq.
17. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
18. 240 Fed. 983 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1936], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol1/iss1/8
. MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Court of Appeals (one of the Judges dissenting) concurred in the view expressed
by the District Court that the practice in question was "unfair trade" and
directed that the injunction should be enlarged to restrain also that practice.' 9
The Supreme Court, by a concurrence of six of the justices, affirmed the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 20 Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented
upon the merits, Mr. Justice Holmes dissented as to the scope and form of
relief granted, and Mr. Justice Clark did not participate in the decision.
This decision is remarkable enough in its result, but it is all the more
remarkable in the underlying principle announced in arriving at that result.
The court definitely rejected the restrictive view as to the substantive content
of the law of unfair competition and adopted as its basis a principle which
establishes at once a substantive content far more extensive and which makes
the purported basis of the restrictive view merely an application of an under-
lying fundamental rather than a fundamental itself.
The rejection of the restrictive view appears in the following quotation:
"It is said that the elements of unfair competition are lacking because
there is no attempt by the defendant to palm off its goods as those of
the complainant, characteristics of the most familiar, if not the most
typical cases of unfair competition. Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff,
Seamans & Benedict, 198 U. S. 118,140. But we cannot consider that
the right to equitable relief is confined to that class of cases."
21
The adoption of an underlying principle establishing a broader substan-
tive content appears in the following quotation:
"The parties are competitors in this field; and, on fundamental
principles, applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges
of the one are liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is
under a duty so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or
unfairly to injure that of the other. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 254. Obviously, the question of what is
unfair competition in business must be determined with particular
reference to the character and circumstances of the business.
'1
2
In answer to the defendant's contention that the news was published
when it appeared in the newspapers of the members of the Associated Press,
and that such publication put an end to any special rights in the news, the
court said:
"The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the
complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights of
19. 245 Fed. 244 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
20. 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
21. Id. at 241.
22. Id. at 235.
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complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as between
themselves. . . . The transaction speaks for itself and a court of
equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair com-
petition in business."2 3
While the progressivism of the court, manifested in this decision, is to be
commended, we cannot bring ourselves into positive disagreement with Mr.
Justice Brandeis' dissent. His progressivism needs no footnote references.
Indeed, he confirms it even in his dissent. He there said:
"The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and has often
satisfied new demands for justice by invoking analogies or by ex-
panding a rule or principle. This process has been in the main wisely
applied and should not be discontinued." 4
Mr. Justice Brandeis' point of dissent was that the case presented a
complexity of private and public interests-to sustain the position of the com-
plainant was to augment its power in the field-query whether that power
should be so augmented by judicial decision when courts are not in a position
to supervise the granting or withholding of the rights and privileges of mem-
bership in the Associated Press System or the terms and conditions of service-
there may be some fields of alleged unfairness where the substantive readjust-
ment or amplification of juristically recognized positions had better be left
to the legislative branch of the government where an entire subject-matter
may be dealt with more comprehensively and where administrative or enforce-
ment agencies may be created if desirable for the more effective dealing with
the complexity of the subject-matter. A meritorious dissent and an arresting
challenge to judicial thought, not only in dealing with non-statutory cases,
but also in interpreting and applying general statutes against "unfair compe-
tition," as we shall hereinafter consider.
This more fundamental concept of the underlying basis of the law of
unfair competition has found expression also in a case now going through the
Illinois Courts, viz., the Barber's Trade case.' 5 There the trial court enter-
tained a bill in equity by an incorporated Barbers' Union, alleging that the
barbers' trade in Chicago had become demoralized due to the alleged fact that
many barbers were cutting prices below socio-economically sound levels,
that a certain schedule of service charges was fair and reasonable, and that the
maintenance of the same was essential for the well-being of the trade. The
bill sought an injunction against the defendants who were non-union barbers,
to restrain them from engaging in alleged unfair and destructive trade prac-
tices, including price-cutting. A decree was entered April 15, 1935, finding,
23. Id. at 239.
24. Id. at 262.
25. Master Barbers' Ass'n. v. Jos. Baiata, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois,
Docket No. 34 S-18528.
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inter alia, that the court should order the defendants to "refrain from unsocial
and destructive conduct and nefarious practices," that certain service charges,
as listed by the Court, had for some time been regarded as normal and reason-
able in the Chicago area, and that the defendants should be and were, by said
decree, enjoined from "singly or collectively engaging in destructive or ruinous
trade practices or nefarious competition" and specifically, inter alia, from en-
gaging in "price cutting."
No direct appeal was taken from such decree, but later, in August, 1935,
a commitment order for contempt was entered for violation of the decree and
an appeal from such order to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, was
allowed but has not as yet been perfected.
Whatever our views may be as to the ultimate result which should be
pronounced upon the facts disclosed in that record, the willingness of the court
to step into present-day socio-economic industrial problems, without statu-
tory specification of the substantive rights of the various interests involved
in that complexity, should satisfy, or at least relieve the despondency of, the
most severe critics of our juridical guild. 6
The foregoing brief review indicates, we believe, that the vitality of the
non-statutory substantive law has only been tapped. With the tremendous
industrial growth since the period of 1833-1847 we may expect to find, and
should find, that vitality utilized in an increasingly fuller measure throughout
the entire field of competitive enterprise, resulting in the development of broad
rules of general application, as the "palming off" rule, and corollaries of more
specific application in particular industries or special situations.
If this may be accomplished under the non-statutory substantive law of
unfair competition, why then this succession of statutes upon the subject?
II
PURPOSE, SCOPE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES
It is to be remembered that the courts did not establish the ultimate
position, considered in the foregoing inquiry, by a single stroke. It has been an
evolutionary process. Indeed, there are probably some courts still unwilling
to concede so comprehensive a scope to the non-statutory law upon this sub-
ject. Mr. Edward S. Rogers has said:
"It must not be assumed that the progress from the state of mind of
Lord Hardwicke in 1742 to the enlightened rule applied by the courts
today was a steady and uninterrupted one. Quite the contrary.
26. The most recent of these critics is Dr. Robinson of the Institute of Human Rela-
tions, Yale University, as set forth in his book Law and the Lawyers (1935). While much of
that criticism rests upon questionable premises, the importance of recognizing that man is a
sociological being in a sociological environment, and all that that signifies, perhaps needs
emphasis in so caustic a criticism as Dr. Robinson makes.
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As a general thing the infringer has always been a little ahead of the
courts. By the time the judicial machinery arrives at a place where
the pirate was yesterday, ready to deal with him, that illusive person
has moved forward and is still a little ahead-at a place where the
courts will not reach until tomorrow-and is there engaged in doing
something which will enable him to advantage himself at someone's
else expense in some manner hitherto unthought of. '2 7
Whether this lag in the development of the substantive law is chargeable
to the bench or bar or both, and whether it is due to a fetishism of precedent,
or to an auto-paralyzation of the judicial power, or to a necessary or desirable
deference to the legislative branch of the government, or otherwise, we need
not here consider. That the lag exists is sufficient occasion for the statutes in
question. The public demand for development of the law upon a subject
often will not await the evolutionary process, but carries forward its will more
promptly and more definitely by specific legislative action.
Furthermore, even if the courts were willing to go forward in exact
synchronism with "the march of time," still there may be fields of alleged
unfairness into which the courts may properly refuse to enter until the legisla-
tive branch of the government has delineated the substantive rights in the
matter. We suggest the following:
(1) The alleged unfairness may be in a subject-matter which is
inherently, or has become, a domain exclusively for legislative action,
and should, accordingly, be left for such action.
(2) Also, the courts may properly be unwilling to give effect
to a proffered trade standard, the soundness of which may well be
open to debate. Proffered standards, the soundness of which, in an or-
ganized community, may properly be debated, should be given effect,
if at all, only by legislative action, not by judicial decicion.
(3) And again, as emphasized by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in the Associated Press case, above-considered, the alleged un-
fairness may present a complexity of interests which can more
readily be adjusted and supervised by legislative action rather
than by the judicial process.
Still another reason for legislative action may be found in remedial con-
siderations. Even in some of the most ordinary cases of unfair competition,
as, for instance, false or misleading labeling or advertising of articles of com-
merce, there may be no competitor sufficiently intereste i to bring suit and the
injury to the consumer may be so distributed that no single consumer is
sufficiently interested to bring suit. In such situations the creation of an ad-
ministrative agency to represent and protect the public interest may be de-
sirable.
27. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 272.
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Accordingly, howsoever progressive the courts may be, there still remains
sufficient occasion for legislative action.
In considering the scope of these statutes, we should distinguish between
those of specific and those of general application. Certain statutes single out
particular practices and proscribe them as unfair competition-others merely
bluster forth in general language, vague and indefinite in content, proscribing
"unfair methods of competition" or "unfair acts."
An illustration of the first type is found in a Federal Statute which was
enacted for the purpose of "prevention of unfair methods of competition"
but which specifies what is proscribed, viz., importing and selling articles in this
country, commonly and systematically, at a price substantially less than the
market value or wholesale price in the country of production at the time
of export.26 Similarly, the Fair Trade Act, being adopted by many States
and hereinabove referred to,29 provides that knowingly selling or advertising
trade-marked articles at less than the retail price specified by the manufac-
turer is "unfair competition." So, also, the Guffey bill specifies a list of particu-
lar acts to be proscribed as "unfair competition." The NRA codes were de-
tailed specifications of acts in the respective industries which were to be re-
garded as "unfair competition."
In this type of enactment questions as to the purpose and scope of the
proscriptive inclusions are relatively few because of the specificness of those
proscriptions. Constitutional questions, however, may be presented. Thus,
the Fair Trade Act of New York has been held invalid by the court of last
resort in that state.30 The similar California act has been held invalid and the
Illinois act valid by lower courts in those respective states. The rulings that
such statutes are invalid appear to rest upon the position that the retailer
may not be restricted in his re-sale of the article by a price stipulation to which
he was not a party. And the NRA codes have been declared invalid as resting
upon an invalid delegation of legislative power.
The broad type of legislative enactment upon the subject is a more pro-
lific source of controversy. Does it extend the substantive law of unfair com-
petition beyond the fundamental scope of the non-statutory law upon the
subject; or is it intended only to provide additional remedial processes? If it
purports to extend the fundamental scope of the substantive law, does it
infringe upon constitutional limitations applicable to legislative action? If
we are satisfied on all this, what are the bounds of the enlarged scope? How-
soever liberal we may desire to be, there must be boundaries somewhere.
Where are they, and how shall they be determined?
Uncertain as to the fundamental basis or substantive scope of the non-
statutory law upon the subject, the courts have properly taken this type of
28. 39 STAT. 798 (1916), 15 U. S. C. A. § 71, el seq. (1926).
29. Supra p. 20.
30. Associated Press Dispatch, Jan. 7, 1936.
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enactment as a legislative declaration that the law upon this subject should
move forward and that the courts are given the power to determine the direc-
tion and extent of the advance. Thus, the Supreme Court, in the Schechter
case, its latest pronouncement upon the subject, has said:
"Debate apparently convinced the sponsors of the legislation (the
Federal Trade Commission Act) that the words 'unfair competi-
tion,' in the light of their meaning at common law, were too narrow.
We have said that the substituted phrase has a broader meaning, that
it does not admit of precise definition; its scope being left to judicial
determination as controversies arise. Federal Trade Commission v.
Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 648, 649, 51 S. Ct. 587, 75 L. Ed. 1324,
79 A. L. R. 1191; Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel, 291
U. S. 304, 310-312, 54 S. Ct. 423, 78 L. Ed. 814."
We recognize the difficulty with which the courts are necessarily con-
fronted in their effort to reduce to definite application that which is inherently
indefinite. But merely to declare that in the application of these shibboleths
it is for the courts to say what is proscribed but that this cannot be delineated
in advance and must await to be decided in each case upon its particular
facts leave us -and, indeed, the court itself-without guide or compass in an
uncharted sea. With such an empty postulate, we shall probably not arrive
at substantial results-haphazard conclusions are likely to occur with high
probability of error. We do not state this in criticism of the courts. What is
most amazing is that, in the rapidity with which the judicial machinery must
move, it turns out so few foibles. If the several courts put as much time in
deciding the cases on this subject as the writer has consumed in the prepara-
tion of this article, the wheels of justice would well-nigh come to a stand-still.
While the writer has been interested as counsel in a number of phrases in this
subject-matter, what is here set forth is submitted as strictly professional
reflection and not as partisan argument. If it be suspected that professional
reflection may have become warped by partisan bias, let the suggestions stand
on their own substance.
1. To extend these general enactments beyond the full fundamental scope
of the non-statutory substantive law upon the subject would involve serious con-
stitutional questions, and, accordingly, the enactments should not be so interpreted.
Are these broad and indefinite generalities to be taken as anything more
than an expression of the public will to "step up" the evolutionary process
in the application of judicial fundamentals-a direction to the courts to
amplify, by their own inherent power, the application of their own basic funda-
mentals upon the subject with additional remedial facilities for enforcing the
broadened application of those fundamentals? If it be assumed that the
judicial power in the subject-matter has been exhausted and that legislative
action was necessary to enlarge the substantive scope of the law upon this subject,
10
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we are confronted with some very serious constitutional limitations applicable
to substantive legislative action.
The Supreme Court held in the Schechter case that empowering the
executive branch of the government to prescribe or approve regulatory codes
"for the government of trades and industries" was an invalid delegation of
legislative power. Is it any less a delegation of legislative power to pass that
function over to the judicial branch of the government by a general and in-
definite grant assumedly extending beyond the inherent judicial power in the
subject-matter? We think not. Chief Justice Marshall said in Wayman v.
Southard:31
"It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or
to any other tribunal, powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative."
Let us look at the question from another angle-the due process clause.
Legislation which penalizes, or restricts rights or industrial activity must be
reasonably specific and definite. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held
invalid a statute which made it illegal, and punishable by fine or imprison-
ment, to make any "unjust" or "unreasonable" rate or charge in handling or
dealing in necessaries.3' In holding that such statute was invalid also in its
civil applications, the court said:
"The defendant attempts to distinguish those cases because they
were criminal prosecutions. But that is not an adequate distinction.
The ground or principle of the decisions was not such as to be applica-
ble only to criminal prosecutions. It was not the criminal penalty that
was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which
was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.
Any other means of exaction, such as declaring the transaction un-
lawful or stripping a participant of his rights under it, was equally
within the principle of those cases." 33
If these statutes proscribing, without further specification, "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair acts" are intended to impose restrictions
and prohibitions upon industrial activity beyond the full scope of the non-
statutory substantive law upon the subject, their validity must seriously be
questioned. Accordingly, on well-settled principles of statutory interpretation
they should not be so construed.34
31. 23 U. S. 311 at 325 (1825).
32. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1920); Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1925).
33. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U. S. 233, 239 (1925); dissenting
opinion in Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. (2d) 247, 261, 266 (C. C. P. A. 1930),
and re such dissenting opinion see Frischer & Co. v. Elting, 60 F. (2d) 711, 714 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932).
34. Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331, 346 (1928).
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2. Neither the non-statutory law upon the subject nor these indefinite
enactments should be held to extend to fields of alleged unfairness, the subject-
matter of which is inherently, or has become, a domain exclusively for legislative
action.
In delimiting the jurisdiction between the State and Federal power in
regulations of commerce, the Courts have long since developed and observed
a three-fold classification of the subject-matter, viz.: (1) that in which Con-
gressional jurisdiction is exclusive; (2) that in which State jurisdiction is
exclusive; and (3) that in which the State has jurisdiction until Congress has
taken possession of the field by action therein.5
This classification serves as a helpful analogy in determining the delimita-
tion of judicial and legislative jurisdiction in the instant subject-matter.
There are some fields of alleged unfairness in which the judicial power may
freely exert itself without awaiting action by the legislative power; other fields
in which the judicial power should not take jurisdiction because the legisla-
tive power has dominated the field by its own action therein; and still other
fields in which the judicial power should not presume jurisdiction even in the
absence of action by the legislative power, since the subject-matter is inher-
ently legislative in character.
Patents are inherently legislative in character. The Constitution has made
it so. But, in addition, Congress, pursuant to the Constitutional grant upon
the subject, has enacted, and from time to time amended, a comprehensive
legislative structure for the granting of patents, and specifying the scope of
rights therein and the remedies for the protection thereof. To change the
substantive law of patents from without by application of the non-statutory
law of unfair competition would appear to be an unwarranted usurpation
by the judiciary upon the legislative domain; and to change it from without
by definite implication from these indefinite enactments would be an unwar-
ranted and probably unconstitutional interpretation of such enactments.
A series of cases has gone through the courts recently involving the pro-
visions of the Tariff Act hereinabove referred to 8 declaring "unfair methods
of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles" unlawful and
empowering the Tariff Commission to hear complaints and to recommend to
the President the exclusion of products violating such provisions.
In Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corporation7 the Tariff Commission has
found that certain products manufactured abroad were being imported and
sold in this country in competition with, and at lower prices than, products
manufactured here; that the domestic producers were protected by United
States patents; and that the imported products infringed said patents. The
35. (1914) 5 R. C. L. 699.
36. Supra p. 20.
37. 39 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. P. A. 1930).
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Commission concluded that this practice was an "unfair method of com-
petition" and an "unfair act" in the importation of articles within the aforesaid
provisions, and, accordingly, recommended the exclusion of such foreign made
products. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the action of
the Commission-one of the Judges dissenting. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.38 This decision was followed by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in the case of In Re Orion Co.-also involving the importation of
products covered by United States patents.3 9
In the case of In Re Northern Pigment Co.,41 the subject-matter was a
product imported from Canada, and there manufactured by a process alleged
to have been covered by a United States process patent. The Frischer case
was held controlling.
Then came the discovery of error and correction. Under the substantive
law of patents a process patent is infringed only by use of the process. Sale or
use of products manufactured in this country by such process does not consti-
tute infringement of such process patent. If the product itself is patentable,
patent therefor should be procured. Afortiori, sale or use in this country of
products manufactured abroad but not covered by United States product
patents does not constitute infringement of any United States process patents
even though such manufacture abroad is by a process patented here. Accord-
ingly, to hold that it was unfair competition to import and sell in this country
products manufactured abroad by a process covered by United States patents
was, in effect, to change the substantive law of patents. The non-statutory
substantive law of unfair competition should not be so extended, and these
general enactments upon unfair competition should not be so interpreted.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in the recent case of In Re
Amtorg Trading Corporation,4 1 frankly' recognized its error and reversed its
previous decision. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on jurisdictional
grounds.42 The point of reversal is clearly stated in the following excerpt from
the opinion of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals:
"Such must be the holding unless the court finds that it was the
purpose of the Congress in enacting section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 (19 USCA Sec. 1337) to broaden the field of substantive
patent rights, and create rights in process patents extending far
beyond any point to which the courts have heretofore gone in
construing the patent statutes.
"Mature consideration of the question leads us to the conclusion that
Congress did not do this. Hence, we conclude that our decision in the
38. 282 U. S. 852 (1930).
39. 71 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. P. A. 1934).
40. 71 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. P. A. 1934).
41. 75 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. P. A. 1935).
42. International Agricultural Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 56 S. Ct. 102 (1935).
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Northern Pigment Co. Case, supra, went further than the statute
provides, and that, in so far as said decisions involved process claims,
it was erroneous. We also withdraw any expressions of adjudication
relating to process patents appearing in the Frischer and Orion Co.
Cases, supra."
This clear-cut reversal and the judicial candor in making it are indeed
commendable. We believe, however, that the corrective action has not gone
far enough.
Throughout the cases on this subject, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has held that its functions in this subject-matter are not judicial, as
such, and that, therefore, it does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
of patents and the several claims thereof.43 So far we need not take issue.
The Court then concludes, however, that it must assume the validity of the
patents and the several claims thereof, and exclude everything within the
reasonable scope of those several claims. With this conclusion we must respect-
fully take issue. If that court does not have jurisdiction to inquire into the
validity of the patent and its claims, it would seem to follow that the court
does not have jurisdiction to step into any subject-matter where the position
of the claimant rests upon alleged patent rights. The granting of a patent
(issued by the United States Patent Office) is an administrative act, not a
legislative act, and is subject to inquiry and adverse decree wherever those
alleged rights are asserted. The reported cases demonstrate that relatively few
patents in litigation have all of their claims sustained, and many patents are
declared invalid in their entirety. To hold that the Court cannot inquire into
the validity of patents and the claims thereof, but that it can nevertheless
bring about the exclusion of products because of those alleged patent rights
is to transform an administrative act (the issuance of the patent) into a legis-
lative or judicial act, and thereby again affect the substantive law of patents.
Accordingly, at least where the invalidity of patents or any of the pertinent
claims thereof are properly contestable, neither the non-statutory law nor these
general enactments should be extended to apply to such subject-matters.
The rule of equity courts to refuse injunctions where the legal rights are in
doubt would appear to be a pertinent analogy.44 We believe, however, that
since the subject-matter of patents is inherently legislative, and the rights of
patent owners and the procedure for the enforcement of the same are provided
in a comprehensive code upon the subject, neither the non-statutory law of
unfair competition nor these indefinite enactments should be held to apply
substantively or even remedially to alleged unfairness consisting exclusively
43. Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. (2d) 247, 267 (C. C. P. A. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U. S. 852 (1930); In Re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F. (2d) 447, 453 (C. C. P. A.
1934); In Re Orion Co., 71 F. (2d) 458, 464 (C. C. P. A. 1934).
44. (1916) 14 R. C. L. 355.
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or essentially of alleged violation or threatened violation of asserted patent
rights.
There are also other fields which, either because of their inherent character
or by legislative action therein, have become exclusively the domain of the
legislative power and not for judicial intercession either under the non-statu-
tory law of unfair competition or under these indefinite enactments upon the
subject.
The entire subject of criminal law should generally be left for enforce-
ment through the specific procedure provided therefor. In addition to the
constitutional questions, above considered, there is here also the Constitutional
guaranty of trial by jury in criminal cases, with which provision the usual
Commission procedure may conflict.
In proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, where it was alleged
that the respondent company's labeling and advertising violated the Pure
Food and Drug Act, the Supreme Court said:
"Whether the respondent in what it was doing was subjecting itself
to administrative or other proceeding under the Statute relating
to the misbranding of foods and drugs, we need not now inquire,
for the administration of that Statute is not committed to the
Federal Trade Commission."
In Keppel v. Federal Trade Commission,46 the Commission ruled that
certain packages of candy for retail sale, a number of pieces of which had
special centers entitling the purchaser to an additional piece of candy or other
object as a prize, was "unfair competition." The Circuit Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit (one of the Judges dissenting) vacated the order of the Com-
mission, and held that since there was no misrepresentation or fraud the sub-
ject matter was not within the jurisdiction of the Commission. While the dis-
senting Judge was of the opinion that the misrepresentation existed-accord-
ingly sustaining the conclusion of "unfair competition"--he was willing to
concede that alleged violation of State or Federal lottery statutes would not
per se sustain the jurisdiction of the Commission. 47
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, and reversed the posi-
tion of the Court of Appeals.48 This result would appear to depart from the
trend of the suggestions here developed and accordingly calls for more detailed
inquiry.
Surely the subject-matter of the Aeppel case is not comprehended within
the substantive scope of the non-.tatutory law of unfair competition. How
then can it be within the valid substantive scope of these indefinite enact-
ments?
45. Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam, 283 U. S. 643 at 654 (1931).
46. 63 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
47. 63 F. (2d) 81 at 84 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
48. Federal Trade Comm. v. Keppel, 291 U. S. 304 (1934).
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While its opinion manifests a recognition that the court was treading
at the very fringe of the asserted jurisdiction, the rationale of its conclusion
does not clearly appear. The court emphasizes three elements in its decision,
but whether those elements are relied upon singly or in necessary combination
is not clear. Such elements are the following: (1) The Commission's purported
finding of injury to the morals of the consumer; (2) the Commission's purported
finding of general trade disapproval; and (3) the opinion that the subject-
matter was not exclusively for legislative action but fundamentally contrary
even to the common law itself. The first and second elements will be discussed
under the next sub-heading. The third element is pertinent to the present
sub-heading and will here be discussed.
Is the subject-matter of chance merchandise, where no dishonesty, fraud
or misrepresentation is involved, to be regarded as exclusively within the do-
main of legislative action or is it so fundamentally against public policy that
the instant jurisdiction should be held to extend to the same? Here again,
historical perspective clarifies our view.
At the English common law, even ordinary wagering contracts were valid
and enforceable.49 The English Statute of 1845 against wagering contracts0
was held not applicable to pending actions, even though the statute provided
that no suit shall be brought "or maintained" for the recovery of money upon
a wager." That such was the common law in this country was recognized,
also, by Chief Justice Cranch, speaking for the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia, in 1834.2 While a contrary position has been expressed in some
State decisions and appears to have found expression also in several Supreme
Court cases"3 , such position is hardly maintainable in the Federal Courts.
There is no common law of the United States as distinguished from the in-
dividual States; and, of course, the individual States have the constitutional
right to determine their own law, and do have different and varying statutory
provisions in this subject-matter. The Supreme Court was confronted with
this difficulty in Bond v. Hume5 and it was there held that a contract, not
invalid as a wagering contract under the laws of New York (a stock exchange
transaction) but invalid as a wagering contract under the laws of Texas,
would nevertheless be enforced in the Federal courts sitting in Texas, even
against a Texas citizen, the contract having been made in New York. Even
49. 25 English and Empire Digest, 397. Similarly see Lord Chief Baron Pollock in
Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, 150 (1853); Lord Campbell in Thackoorseydass v.
Dhondmull, 6 Moore P. C. C. 300 (1848); and Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice, in Good v.
Elliott, 3 T. R. 697, 704 (1790).
50. 8 & 9 VICT., C. 109, § 18.
51. Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22 (1848).
52. Fleming v. Foy, Fed. Cas. No. 4,862 (C. C. D. C. 1834).
53. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499 (1884).
54. (1917) 12 C. J. 196.
55. 243 U. S. 15 (1917).
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horse-race betting was not illegal at common law, and in times not so far distant
was freely participated in even by the clergy.M Similarly, as to lotteries, where
the clergy prayed for the success of their communicants in drawings about to
take place.57 And in early English statutes we find certain class prohibitions
against playing games for money, but with more liberality as to "Knights and
Clergymen."s8
Does the trend of legislation on matters of chance, betting, etc., indicate
a constant progression to an absolute finality in social judgment? A moment's
reflection gives the answer. New York in 1926 amended its provisions regarding
horse-racing and in 1934 further modified its statutes upon bookmaking at the
race tracks.59 In 1927, Illinois amended its statutes, again legalizing betting
at horse-races.0 In 1931 Florida similarly amended its statutes."' In 1933
California, Ohio, Texas, and Washington similarly amended their statutes."
Massachusetts joined the ranks of these States in 19343 and Oregon in 1935.4
This is not a complete listing but only illustrative-a number of other States
have within recent years adopted similar legislation. England, also, in 1928
adopted The Race-Course Betting Act amending the prohibitive act of 1853,
and again legalized betting at horse-races.' We find also State legislation
recently adopted, modifying the statutes against lotteries and gambling to
permit chance features in advertising programs. 6 The State of Florida has
recently adopted a statute legalizing and licensing slot machines, and the
Supreme Court of Florida, in an interesting decision, has sustained the enact-
ment in spite of a Constitutional prohibition against "lotteries." 7 Even
technical lotteries, as such, are undergoing a social reappraisal. An Act
sponsored and supported by many prominent citizens is now pending in Con-
gress for the legalization of lotteries for public or charitable purposes; an
association of such citizens has been organized under the laws of New York' s
to bring about their desired change in statutory provisions, and a nationwide
56. See BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916) 177-180. We, of course, are not
in sympathy with delvings into the private lives of leading citizens, but when those lives
reveal sociological facts pertinent to sociological problems, those facts should not be over-
looked.
57. ASHTON, THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN ENGLAND (1898) 230.
58. ASHTON, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LOTTRaES (1893) 13.
59. N. Y. Laws, c. 440. Id. 1934, c. 233.
60. Ill. Laws 1927, p. 28, et. jeq.
61. Fla. Acts 1931, c. 14832.
62. Calif. Laws 1933, c. 436; Ohio Laws 1933, p. 367, et seq.; Tex. Laws, p. 433, et
seq.; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 55.
63. Mass. Laws 1934, c. 374.
64. Ore. Laws 1935, c. 244.
65. 18 & 19 GEo. V, c. 41.
66. OKLA. STAT. (1929) art. 65, § 2310; Wy. REv. STAT. (1931), § 32-815; NEV.
Coup. LAws § 10201.
67. Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486 (Fla. 1935).
68. National Conference for the Legalization of Lotteries, Inc.
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poll conducted by one of our current magazines indicates an amazingly sub-
stantial sentiment for statutory modification. 9 The subject is of such current
and widespread interest that the Library of Congress has recently prepared an
exhaustive bibliography of foreign and domestic research materials. Punch
boards and push cards have been used so extensively in interstate commerce
that the Federal Government through its National Industrial Recovery
Administration recognized the Punch Board Manufacturing Industry and
approved a Code of Fair Competition for that industry.70 Punch boards, etc.
are being taxed, as "games" under the federal excise tax laws.n
The foregoing emphasizes what has been stated by Dr. Smith, one of our
contemporary historians in sociological trends:
"The task, once assumed by the theologian of discovering and
proclaiming the laws of right and wrong, has now been taken over
by the psychologist and sociologist. To the historian falls the
humbler duty of recording the infinite variety of moral practice and
ethical theory. There is no act, however repugnant to the prejudices
of one society, which hai not been tolerated and encouraged in some
other community; there is no act, however socially deleterious it
may appear to be, that has not at some time and in some place, been
tolerated and encouraged."' '
Recognizing this, the courts have repeatedly announced that they should
not and will not decree a "public policy" on a legislative subject-matter
beyond the provisions of the legislative enactments in that regard and will
apply those legislative enactments only to the extent therein provided-and
not beyond. That has been specifically held as to lotteries by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the License Tax cases," and has been recog-
nized, generally, in at least two other Supreme Court decisions.74 That posi-
tion was followed also by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, with
reference to "chance drawings" in theatre tickets in General Theatres, Inc.
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,75 and has been followed, also, by the English
69. FORTUNE MAGAZINE, October, 1935, 170.
70. NRA approved Code No. 316.
71. See Treasury Department Cumulative Bulletin XI-2, p. 478.
72. 1 SMITH, HISTORY OF MODERN CULTURE, C. XVII, 525; 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SO-
CIAL SCIENcES, 643, et seq.
73. 72 U. S. 462 (1866).
74. Patton v. U. S., 281 U. S. 276, 306 (1930); Twin City Co. v. Harding Glass Co.,
283 U. S. 353, 357 (1931).
75. The Circuit Court of Appeals on February 8, 1935, granted an inj'anctive order in
aid for its appellate jurisdiction, thereby in effect reversing the action of the lower court
reported in 9 Fed. Supp. 546. On the particular point of interest, the court, as reported to
us by counsel in the case, asked the District Attorney whether the chance-drawing feature
there in question would sustain prosecution, to which "the District Attorney replied 'Not
successfully.' The Judge said, 'That means not at all. So you admit the chance drawings
do not violate the letter of the law?' To which the District Attorney replied 'Yes.' 'But,'
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courts.78 The common law, from very early times, classified this subject-
matter as at most malum prohibitum, not malum in se. 77
None of the foregoing citations appear to have been called to the Court's
attention in the Keppel case; none of them are discussed in the opinion in
that case; and, indeed, no citation is given for the purported statement of
law there set forth.
If our suggestions thus far are sound, the position of the courts in the sub-
ject-matter involved in the Keppel case should be that if such subject-matter
is prohibited by the specific Federal enactments against lotteries, the enforce-
ment of such enactments is for the criminal branch of the government, not
for the Federal Trade Commission; if such subject-matter is not within such
specific enactments, as is conceded, the subject-matter is in a legislative field
and the instant jurisdiction should not be held to extend thereto. Since the
Commission would not have jurisdiction to enforce a Federal criminal statute
upon the subject, afortiori it does not have jurisdiction to enforce State enact-
ments in this subject-matter, not only because of the basic lack of jurisdiction
but also because of the diversity in statutory provisions in the several States.
Accordingly, the result of the Keppel decision would appear to be of
questionable soundness unless it may be sustained upon either of the other two
elements above mentioned. Those elements will be considered under the next
subject heading.
3. This jurisdiction should not be held to extend to subject-matters, the
alleged "unfairness" of which rests upon assertions in the realm of controversial
opinion, as such, as distinguished from ascertainable fact. Such fields should be
left for determination and specification by legislative action, not by judicial
decision.
In Silver Company v. Federal Trade Commission,78 the Commission charged
and purported to find that the respondent company was guilty of "unfair
competition" in its representations as to the breed of its hogs. The record
showed that the respondent's hogs had been developed from earlier types of
stock, but there was a sharp conflict in the testimony of experts as to whether
such developing process could bring about a change in breed classification.
The court held that since the charge of "unfairness" rested upon an assertion
on which there was an intelligent difference of opinion among those qualified
to speak, and not upon an issue of ascertainable fact, as such, the Commission's
jurisdiction over "unfair competition" did not extend to such subject-matter.
said the Judge, 'you claim they violate the spirit (italics in report) of the law, is that cor-
rect?' To which the answer was, 'Yes.' 'Then,' said the Judge, 'there must be two laws.'"
76. Macnee v. Persian Investment Corp. 44 Ch. D., 306, 312-13 (1890).
77. 2 BouviEl's LAw DiCTIONARY, "Malum In Se", 99.
78. 289 Fed. 985 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
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A similar situation is found in the case of Raladam v. Federal Trade
Commission.75 The Commission there charged and purported to find that the
respondent company was guilty of "unfair competition" in advertising that its
product (claimed to be an obesity cure) was "scientific" and could be used
with "safety." There was a sharp conflict of reputable medical testimony
on that question. In vacating the Commission's order, the court said:
"Considering and contrasting these views, it seems to us quite im-
possible to say that the problem, whether this remedy, in the en-
vironment of these advertisements, is or is not 'scientific', presents a
question of fact, capable of being dogmatically fixed, in one way or the
other, as disputed facts are decided. We think that it was at the
beginning of the proceeding and continued to the end to be a matter
of opinion .... 81
An analogous situation is found in the case of American School of Magnetic
Healing v. Mc.dnnulty,8' where the Postmaster General sought to declare the
representations of a mind-healing cure establishment as fraudulent and issued
a statutory stop order against their use of the mails. In holding that the bill
of complaint stated a good cause of action for injunction against the Post-
master General's order, the Supreme Court held that the efficacy of the healing
of apparently physical diseases by mental processes was a subject on which
there was an intelligent difference of opinion, as, also, there was an intelligent
difference of opinion as to the healing efficacy of electro-therapeutics and as
to the preventive efficacy of vaccination, and, within the strictly medical
profession itself, a sharp difference of opinion as to the healing efficacy of the
homeopathic or allopathic remedies; and that if the Postmaster General could
under these statutes against "fraud" stop one, he could, of course, stop any of
the others or all, depending upon his own particular views in the subject-
matter. Such power and jurisdiction, the Court held, was not contemplated
by the Act. The pertinent point of the decision was stated as follows:
"Unless the question may be reduced to one of fact as distinguished
from mere opinion, we think these statutes cannot be invoked ......
79. 42 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), aff'd, Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam, 283
U. S. 643 (1931).
80. 42 F. (2d) 430, 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); while in the Supreme Court opinion
affirming this decision a passing expression is made which throws some doubt upon the
applicability of the quoted position of the Court of Appeals upon that record (283 U. S.
643, 646), the Supreme Court makes it clear that it was considering one point only -a point
clearly sufficient to sustain the judgment of the Court of Appeals and not here involved
(283 U. S. 643, 647). In light of the decision of the Suprem. Court in American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, next considered (infra, Note 81) it can hardly be sup-
posed that upon direct consideration of the question the Supreme Court will depart from
the judicially sound position there taken.
81. 187 U. S. 94 (1902).
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If the foregoing is sound-as we believe it to be-the recent ruling
of the Court of Appeals in Hughes v. Federal Trade Commission,2 would seem
to be erroneous. The subject-matter of that case was a medicinal preparation,
the efficacy of which appeared to be in substantial controversy among reput-
able members of the medical profession who testified in the case. So far as
appears from the opinion, however, the point and authorities here considered
were not brought to the court's attention.
We return to consider the two remaining elements in the Keppel case.
The commission's findings in that case recited that the candy packages there
involved were sold principally in school stores and neighborhood candy stores,
patronized largely by children; that the retail distribution of such packages
having prizes distributable by lot or chance taught and encouraged gambling
among children; that many competitors regarded such method of distribution
as morally bad and encouraging gambling among the children and either
refused to manufacture similar products or manufactured them by compulsion
of competition, but contrary to their moral judgment.
If those purported findings of alleged moral injury and their implications
are factually true, no one will desire to contest the result of the Keppel case.
But are those purported findings factually true or are they only opinions in a
socially controversial subject-matter? There is the crux of the Keppel case.
In fairness to the Supreme Court and in explanation of the Keppel de-
cision, it should be stated that the case was presented virtually upon a default
record. The respondent, though time and the place were set therefor, produced
no evidence. The allegations and affirmative testimony of consumer injury
and trade disapproval went into the record, and the respondent offered not
one iota of evidence in contradiction. Consequently, the court was without
an adequate exposition of the trade and consumer facts pertinent to the issues
before it.
The plausibility of such purported findings and implications, without
any adverse testimony in the record to contradict them or to challenge in-
quiry is, we recognize, persuasive. But perhaps open-minded inquiry into the
facts would explode that plausibility. John Dewey reminds us that facts are
necessary before there can be any thinking upon a subject; and that "open-
mindedness" as an essential attitude in real thinking includes an active desire
"to give heed to facts from whatever source they come; to give full attention
to alternative possibilities; to recognize the possibility of error even in the
beliefs that are dearest to us."8 3 This caution, as pointed out by one of our
social scientists of international recognition, is particularly in order in ap-
proaching problems of sociological involvement; 4 and doubly so when the
82. 77 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935).
83. DEWEY, How WE THiNK 30, 34.
84. "Such self-detachment is more readily achieved in the natural sciences than in the
social sciences. It is an easy matter to look at an ant with the sceptical disinterestedness of
21
Fathchild: Fathchild: Statutory Unfair Competition
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1936
STATUTORY UNFAIR COMPETITION
problem involves considering the moral fibre and intelligence of children and
the effect of their environment and experiences thereupon8s And yet-how
amazing, if true, in the very subject-matters of sociological involvement, ac-
cording to critics whose views should not lightly be disregarded, our profession
is there most willing to act upon prepossession, unreasoned learnings, and super-
ficial notionalizing.M
In a more recent proceeding against another candy concern, the Johnson
Candy Company, the Federal Trade Commission again went forward with
the opinion testimony of several members in the industry, to the effect that the
product was morally injurious to the children and that such members of the
industry were morally opposed to the manufacture and sale of said products.
In that case, however, the respondent took issue. He offered to prove that the
product was not morally injurious and did not induce gambling habits, that
such products had been a substantial part of the candy industry as long as
there had been a candy industry; that millions of people now in adult life had
enjoyed those candies in their childhood and had not been injured thereby;
that similar products in competing industries enjoyed national distribution
as the "lucky stick" in ice cream bars and "free" coupons in chewing gum;
that such products, including the products in question were extensively pur-
chased by religious denominational schools, of several different denominations,
for resale to their pupils in their own candy counters, and also by public schools
where teachers had absolute control over the purchases made for the school
cafeteria, etc. The respondent offered to prove, also, by parents and teachers
themselves, that the children enjoyed these candy packages and were not
injured thereby. The respondent offered also the testimony of sociologists of
national standing to contradict the charge against these packages and to show
that at most the alleged objections were not matters of factual ascertainment,
but only of individual bias, belief and opinion; that as many people distinguish
between a glass of wine and a glass of alcohol, although the exhiliarating ele-
ment in the wine is its alcoholic content, so millions of people distinguish be-
tween prize candies and "gambling schemes." The respondent offered, also,
experimental science. It is much more difficult to look at human beings that way. But even
if complete success in such an effort is impossible, we can at least try to succeed in part,
and reduce the power and influence of sentiments, preconceptions, beliefs, to a minimum.
Only at that price can progress in the social sciences be achieved." 1 PARETO, THE MIND
AND SOCIETY 72.
85. See JAMES SULLEY, STUDIES OF CHILDHOOD 228; HALL, EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS
preface and pp. 243-244, 258-259; SIDONIE MATSNER GRUENBERO, Director of the Child
Study Association of America, PARENTS, CHILDREN AND MONEY 24-25, 31 and GUIDANCE
or CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH-READINGS IN CHILD STUDY 117, 120; also DEWEY, How WE
THINx, particularly the section, THINKING DEMANDS A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT FROM
CHILDHOOD.
86. See ROBINSON (of the Institute of Human Relations, Yale University and lecturer
in the Yale School of Law) LAW AND LAWYERS (1935). The truth is, unless we ourselves are
spinning with prepossessions, that our judicial decisions reflected far more sociological
realism than Dr. Robinson finds there, but perhaps less than our critics should find there.
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the testimony of others in the industry-some manufacturing similar products
and others manufacturing different specialties, not at all involved in the con-
troversy-that they had no objection to the packages in question, morally or
otherwise; and that numerous reputable concerns in the candy industry were
manufacturing and distributing the products in question or products similar
thereto.
The Commission's Trial Examiner excluded or disregarded all this prof-
fered testimony as immaterial. His position was that the fact that some men
in the industry thought it was morally bad, and accordingly objected thereto,
was sufficient; that although their beliefs might be wrong and although others
in the industry might not be in accord with such beliefs, that was not material.
The mere existence of adverse beliefs, whether right or wrong, in the minds of
some part of the industry was the critical factor.
The error in that position is, we believe, self-evident. Nevertheless the
Court of Appeals sustained it. Having appeared as Counsel in that case,
we shall not amplify our disagreement.
That moralistic issues are not for judicialistic determination, however, is
confirmed by the very same court (a different grouping of Judges sitting) in a
more recent case. In City of Chicago v. Kirkland,88 it appeared that the Mayor
of Chicago had revoked the license of a theatre exhibiting a performance
deemed by him to be immoral. There were civic leaders in the record on both
sides of the question as to the alleged immoral effect upon the observer. The
court held that adjudication of the moral issue was not for the court; that
since it did not appear that the Mayor had acted arbitrarily, his action was
not subject to further review.
Such jurisdiction, however, has not been, and perhaps cannot validly be,
vested in the Federal Trade Commission. 9 And clearly no such jurisdiction
has been or can be vested in a fractional part of an industry. 90 If in complaints
87. Walter H. Johnson Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 78 F. (2d) 717 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935).
88. 79 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
89. Silver Co., Raladam, and American School of Magnetic Healing cases, supra pp.
38, 39. It is for the courts and not the Federal Trade Commission to determine what is
"unfair competition" within the meaning of these enactments. Federal Trade Comm. v.
Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920); Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam, 283 U. S. 643, 648
(1931); and the numerous citations following such references. See also National Harness
Manufacturers' Ass'n. v. Federal Trade Comm., 268 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920).
90. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 537 (1935); Federal
Trade Comm. v. Sinclair Co., 261 U. S. 463, 475 (1923). In the Johnson case, supra note 87,
it appeared that approximately 85o of the membership of the industry's principal trade
association had been manufacturing candies within the general subject-matter there con-
cerned, and that the aggregate volume of business of those who testified that in their opin-
ion the candies in question were harmful was less than one per cent (1%) of the total vol-
ume of the industry; and none of those, either within or without the industry, who took
issue with the professed moralism of that fractional part of the industry were permitted
to testify.
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of alleged "unfair competition" it appears that the alleged unfairness of the
subject-matter rests upon assertions in the realm of controversial opinion,
as such, and not in the realm of ascertainable fact, it should be held that such
subject-matters are neither for a fractional part of the industry nor for the
Federal Trade Commission nor for the courts to proscribe as "unfair competi-
tion." If a portion of the industry or a portion of the public want proscriptions
in such subject-matters, their objections should be addressed to the legislative
and not to the judicial branch of the Government.
If, contrary to the considerations here suggested, some courts may never-
theless be tempted, either by outward or inward persuasions, to assume juris-
diction of such subject-matters, they would do well, if they genuinely desire
to be right, analytically, or at least in historical perspective, to follow the
precedent of "the Judges of the Areopagus, who finding themselves baffled by
a case, ordered the litigants to come back again in a hundred years."'"
In conclusion on this phase of the consideration, we refer to the compre-
hensive Canadian enactment on this subject. Adopted in 1932, the Canadians
had the benefit of our experience with these general enactments and have
profited thereby. They devised an expression broad enough to be compre-
hensively effective, but not so broad as to be meaningless. Their statute, after
proscribing two classes of specific acts, proscribes also "any other business
practice contrary to honest industrial and commercial usage."9 " That far, we
believe, even the vitality of our non-statutory substantive law of unfair com-
petition extends; beyond that our indefinite enactments should not be held to
extend.
4. The alleged unfairness may present a complexity of interests and
considerations more readily to be adjusted, if adjustment is needed, by com-
prehensive legislative action rather than by judicial process.
We have heretofore pointed to the progressivism of the Supreme Court
in the Associated Press case93 but have also expressed our inability to disagree
with Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent.94 The position put forth in that dissent
is sound and even the other members of the court undoubtedly do not dispute
it-their difference lies on the issue of its applicability to the record there
before the court. That issue we need not here consider.
But if that position was not applicable to prevent the court from entering
the fields of news piracy, it hardly can be urged as an objection to their
entering also the fields of style and design piracy. We recognize that using
the word "piracy" may be reasoning in a circle. The courts, however, used
such expression rather constantly through the successive decisions in the
Associated Press case, and such use may perhaps be justified if it is found
91. LOWENTHAL, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MONTAIGNE 237.
92. THE UNFAIR COMPETITION ACT, 22-23 GEO. V, c. 38 (1932).
93. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
94. Supra p. 25.
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to reflect a general usage in the industry concerned. As such, it may be evi-
dence of a trade standard in general recognition throughout the industry.
Many industries have sought to secure protection in the field of styles,
designs and models. Relief by specific legislation has not been forthcoming.
Code provisions were adopted under the NRA95, but this, of course, is now of
no avail. Perhaps the subject-matter is legislative in character, and according-
ly the instant jurisdiction should not be held to extend thereto. Perhaps,
however, it is not legislative in character for want of Congressional power.
Or, perhaps, it is more akin to trade-marks, and, therefore, of judicial origin
and substantive character. Or, perhaps, in any event, there is a complexity
of public and private interests requiring a comprehensive legislative treatment
rather than judicial intercession. These are questions which warrant judicial
inquiry in considering the substantive scope of the instant jurisdiction-non-
statutory as well as statutory-in its relation to an increasing industrial de-
mand for amplification of rights in the subject-matter of styles, designs and
models.
The position here considered is, we believe, strikingly applicable to the
subject-matter considered in the Keppel and Johnson cases, but will not be
enlarged upon here. Its general pertinence in this field of the law cannot be
over-emphasized.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of these indefinite enactments against "unfair com-
petition" is a fairly recent field of judicial labor. We believe that the courts
will be the first to concede that because of that indefiniteness, there has been
much groping and stumbling in their efforts to apply them. But the courts
have been striving to find the unfindable, viz., an appliable Congressional
intent. The only intent manifested is that there should be no intent. The
fundamental approach must be different. We have endeavored to suggest it.
But, as heretofore pointed out, we have been interested. Our point of view
may have become warped. We may have erred. Nevertheless, we feel freer in
speaking our convictions through these channels than through briefs-there
is not the restraint of the presumption of partisan banter.
If what we have said serves only to stimulate a deeper research and more
fundamental consideration of these problems than the courts have had time
to give them heretofore, we shall feel fully compensated for our efforts even
if all that we have said is discarded. Our dominant purpose, in which all can
agree, is that in the utilization of this instrument of industrial control, we
should wield it efficiently and not awkwardly or oppressively.
95. See, e. g., Advertising Specialty Mfg. Code, art. VIII, § (b); Blouse & Skirt Code,
art.V, § 4; Carpet & Rug Code, art. VII, § 9; Lace Curtain Code, art. VIII, § 5; Millinery &
Dress Trimming Code, art. VII § (b) (5); Silk Textile Code, art. VIII, § 2 (a) (5); Silverware
Mfg. Code, art. VIII, § 5; Velvet Code, art. VII, § 9; Wall Paper Code, art. VII, § (a);
Watch Case Mfg. Code, art. VII, § 5.
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